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Abstract: Although the physical and emotional costs of terrorism are widely known, the financial 
price of terror attacks is still obscure. This paper seeks to examine the heightened uncertainty 
surrounding terror attacks across the two Germany’s largest and most visited cities (in particular, 
Berlin and Munich) to shed some light on the reactions of disaggregated German stock market to 
those unforeseen events. We robustly find that the impact of terrorism varies across sectors. The 
Berlin attack causes substantial German stock price moves. The airline, hotels, leisure and 
communication services were harmfully influenced to those events. Nevertheless, the banking 
and financial services and defense were weakly affected. More importantly, the German stock 
market has proven a sharp resilience and a prompt and efficient adaptation. The investors’ 
cognizance of the Germany’s modern greatly diversified, and highly competitive economy and 
the higher institutional quality have allowed to appropriately dealing with adverse consequences 
associated with terrorist attacks. 
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1. Introduction 
 In recent years, terror attacks became more enduring and widespread than in previous 
years. The terrorism is a very complicated geopolitical issue that hugely harms the international 
peace, the security of cities, governments, nations and markets worldwide. In recent years, terror 
attacks became more enduring and widespread than in previous years. The terrorism is a very 
complicated geopolitical issue that hugely harms the international peace, the security of cities, 
governments, nations and markets worldwide. Although an immense amount of thought and 
tremendous interest have been devoted to the direct costs caused by terror attacks including 
severe physical injuries, deaths, damaged goods, harmed infrastructure as well as the emotional 
and behavioral effects of terrorism have been largely studied (inter alia: Chen and Siems 2004; 
Karolyi and Martell 2010), much less attention has been given to the indirect costs of terrorism 
including the financial costs. Indeed, the investigation of the effects of terrorism on financial 
markets became more frequent at the academic level since the unprecedented 11 September 
Terrorist attacks (for example, Chen and Siems 2004, Karolyi and Martell 2005, among others). 
Chen and Siems (2004) carried out an event study methodology to assess the impact of terrorism 
on US capital markets. The analysis revealed that that the US capital markets returns to the 
normal state promptly after an attack. Karolyi and Martell (2005) utilized the same method to 
examine the reactions of equity prices to terror attacks and to determine in which countries 
companies are targets. They deduced that the losses caused by terrorism are more pronounced 
when the targets are located in more democratic or richer countries.  They added that human 
capital losses are significantly linked to sharp adverse stock price responses. Likewise, Johnston 
and Nedelescu (2005) assessed the role of market efficiency to safeguard against unforeseen 
terrorist attacks and found that the appropriate response of the authorities and coordinated 
efforts among them can enable financial markets to be more efficient in effectively coping with 
sudden terror chocks. Arin et al. (2008) explored the impact of terror on different financial 
markets, and showed that terror exerted a significant and stronger influence on both stock 
market returns and the stock market volatility, and the magnitude of these effects are likely to be 
more pronounced in emerging markets.  
 However, as far as the impacts of terror on disaggregated stock markets is concerned, a 
very limited strand of literature has been found (see, for instance, Drakos and Kutan 2003; 
Schiereck and Zeidler 2009; Kolaric and chiereck 2016; Apergis and Apergis 2017; Hadi et al. 
2019). For instance, Drakos and Kutan (2003) explored the terror consequences on tourism 
industries by delving into the cases of Greece, Israel, and Turkey. Significant contagion effects of 
terrorism on their respective equity markets were consistently shown. Schiereck and Zeidler 
(2009) assessed the responses of financial and banking services shares to terrorist attacks and 
found significant detrimental effects. Kolaric and chiereck (2016) empirically examined the 
dynamics of airline stock prices over the heightened uncertainty surrounding the Paris and 
Brussels terror attacks. They documented that the stock prices follow the efficient market 
hypothesis. By meticulously evaluating the performances of 27 biggest US, Canadian, and 
European airline companies, they showed that terrorism harmfully affect airline industries. 
Further, Apergis and Apergis (2017) tried to address whether the Paris terror attack exacerbated 
the stock market volatility of the biggest defense industries. They documented that terrorism 
intensified the volatility of defense stocks. More recently, Hada et al. (2019) studied the impact of 
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terrorism on the performances tourism, travel, and leisure companies (in terms of returns and 
volatility) in China, France, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
A harmfull effect is found for all the countries under study, with the excption of China. 
  To our best knowledge, no study has been tried to empirically assess the impacts of terror 
shocks on the different sectors of German economy. In 2016, Germany has experienced 
successive terror attacks with 22 innocent people killed and 111 injured. Not to bring out the 
human tragedy, the panic and horror caused by terror, the economic implications might be 
ruinous for an economy where the total contribution of travel and tourism to GDP exceeds 8% 
in 2015. According to the World Data Atlas3, the tourist bookings to Berlin were collapsed by 
approximately 6.6%, dominantly owing to concerns regarding security in Europe (and Germany, 
in particular). The terror incidents occurring in Germany over 2016 were not isolated events. In 
2015 and 2016, the terrorist attacks happened in various countries where tourism represents a 
prominent share of GDP, including France (9.1%), U.K. (11.2%), Italy (10.2%), US (8.2%), 
Thailand (20.8%), Egypt (11.5%), Tunisia (12.6%) and Turkey (12.9%), among others. Following 
the Paris, Brussels and Berlin terror attacks, France, Belgium and Germany are on alert. In Figure 
A.1 (Appendix), countries are color-coded and numbered based on the extent of terror threat.  
 The present research explores two events occurring in Germany’s largest and most visited 
cities (in particular, Berlin and Munich) to evaluate how the risk and return in the German stock 
market changed as a reaction to those events. The responses of sectoral German stock market to 
each event is employed to rigorously determine the extent and the direction of change. In 
particular, the present analysis conducts a modified event study methodology4 that evaluates the 
abnormal returns attitudes for various industries of the German share market around the days of 
Munich attack (July 22, 2016) and Berlin terror shock (December 19, 2016). The event study 
methodology quantifies the economic impact of an event on the returns of a specific company, 
also called abnormal returns. The latter are determined by subtracting the returns that have been 
realized when the studied event would not have happened from the contemporaneous returns of 
the equities. 
 We deduce from our results that, the effect of uncertainty around Munich and Berlin terror 
attacks is sector-specific. The airline, hotels, leisure and telecommunications sectors were the 
most harmfully influenced by the attacks. Other sectors proved their great resilience (in 
particular, banking and financial services and defense). Some elements have been advanced to 
explain the heterogeneous reactions of the disaggregated German stock market. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 depicts meticulously the 
event study methodology. Section 3 summarizes and discusses the obtained outcomes. Some 
Section 4 concludes.  
                                                          
3
 For more details, you can refer to this link: https://knoema.fr/atlas. 
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utilizing an improved event-study methodology based on new researches (in particular, Ramiah et al. 2016 ; Pham et 
al. 2018). 
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2. Methodology and data 
While trying to effectively assess the financial price of terrorism, we evaluated the 
behaviors of various sectors of German stock market to the 2016 Munich and Berlin terror 
attacks (22 July and 19 December, respectively). For this purpose, we adjust the stock returns to 
obtain the ex post and ex ante abnormal returns.  
The abnormal returns are, thereafter, grouped into the investigated sectors in order to 
properly measure the disaggregated average (D) at time t, (ARDt) expressed as follows : 
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Where )( itRE  is determined by means of this equation: 
)~~()( 10 ftmtit rrRE itit        (2) 
With Pit corresponds to the adjusted price of a specific industry i at time t, )( itRE  denotes the 
anticipated return on industry i at time t, 
mtr
~ is the German market return, and 
ftr
~ represents the 
German risk-free rate. 
Daily frequency data were downloaded from DataStream covering the period from January 
2012 to June 2017. Our sample data incorporates seven sectors of the German stock price index 
(DAX). The DAX mainly consists of thirty biggest German companies trading on the Frankfurt 
Stock Exchange. Throughout this investigation, we concentrate on sectors whose core business is 
presumed to be highly sensitive to terrorism; these sectors include Airlines, hotels and leisure, 
telecommunications, banking and financial services (banks, insurance, reinsurance and financial 
services), defense and the German treasury bills as a potential proxy for the risk-free rate. The 
risk-free rate is defined as the interest an investor would anticipate from an investment totally 
free from monetary loss the yields in the German treasury bills market are often utilized as the 
risk-free rate for German investors.5  
In the following, the event window and the post-event window are employed while 
attempting to examine the evolving behavior of sectoral German stock market prior to and post- 
Berlin and Munich terror attacks. 
For Munich attack, we account for a window of 260 days, consisting of 239 days prior to 
the event day and 20 days after the event day. Concerning the Berlin attack, we consider a 
window of 120 days composed of 99 days6 before the attack and 20 days after the terror shock. 
For both events, we estimate the abnormal returns for each industry i during well specified event 
windows, in particular [−5;+5],[ −10;+10], and [-20; +20]. To determine the change in systematic 
risk, a dummy variable (DV), which takes the value 1 on the first day following the terror (i.e., 
both Berlin and Munich) attack and 0 otherwise, is included. We multiply the DV by the market 
risk premium to create an interaction variable. The function to estimate is written as follows : 
    ittiftmtiftmtiiftit DVDVrrrrrr  ~*~~~~~~ 3210  (3) 
                                                          
5 The of German Treasury bill is downloaded from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. For more details, you can 
refer to this link: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/INTGSTDEM193N. 
6 We consider the period beginning after Munich attack and prior to Berlin attack. 
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where itr
~ is the industry i’s return at time t, ftr
~  denotes the risk free rate, mtr
~ is the market return, 
DV corresponds to the dummy variable that takes the value 1 on the first day after the terrorist 
event and 0 otherwise, 0i  denotes the intercept, 
1
i corresponds to the coefficient of the short-
run systematic risk of a specific company, 2i corresponds to the coefficient of change in the 
industry risk, and 3i measures the coefficient of DV, it
~ represents the error term.  
 
3. Main empirical results  
3.1. Event study methodology results 
This study compares the responses of disaggregated German stock market to uncertainty 
surrounding two 2016 terror attacks. We focus on sectors that are assumed to be most exposed 
to terrorist attacks. These sectors mainly include airlines, hotels and leisure, telecom, banking and 
financial services and defense. 
Table 1 (Panel A) displays the abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns prior to 
and after the Munich attack (i.e., after 5, 10 and 20 days). Our findings reveal that the impact of 
the Munich terror attack on the German stock market varies across the different sectors under 
investigation. Some sectors responded positively to this event including banking and financial 
services and defense. More specifically, the banking and financial services industry is influenced 
positively by approximately 1.71% over 5 days after the event day, and continued to experience 
an increased return after 20 days by about 3.27%. The defense sector witnessed an abnormal 
return of approximately 2.14% after 20 days. The resilience of banking and financial services can 
be highly explained by the soundness, the stability and the diversification of German banking 
system. The positive reaction of the defense sector to the risk of terrorism is also not surprising. 
In fact, the recent increase in terror attacks pushed the German government to grant immense 
aid to defense and security industries while attempting to deeply encourage them to develop 
innovative defense products allowing to efficaciously preventing possible threats. However, three 
sectors harmfully reacted to terror, in particular airlines, hotels and leisure and 
telecommunications. Airlines experienced a negative abnormal return over 5 days after the 
Munich attack, but this response becomes positive after 20 days. The immediate negative reaction 
of airlines industry is widely anticipated. A significant literature on the focal topic claimed that 
terror reshape tourism demand yielding to an increased desire to cancel travel especially instantly 
after the attack (inter alia: Seddighi et al. 2001; Stafford et al. 2002; Chen and Noriega 2004; 
Kingsbury and Brunn 2004). It must be pointed out that the attitude is one of the main driving 
forces of tourist’ motives towards a destination. Indeed, negative attitudes owing to a terrorist 
incident may raise safety concerns, and as a consequence harmfully affects the travel decision 
(Stafford and Armoo 2002; Floyd et al. 2003). Hotels and leisure sector was also adversely 
impacted over 5 days after the event date, before recovering after ten days. Expectedly, 
immediately after a terror attach, tourists might abandon travelling if the major goal of the travel 
is for leisure (Santana-Gallego et al. 2016). The telecommunications sector was also negatively 
impacted after 10days, but it its reaction becomes positive after 20 days (i.e., CAR of 1.54%). The 
remarkable enhancement of information exchange in the fight against terror incidents becomes 
much more appealing in Germany after the consecutive 2016 terror attacks.  
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Table 1 (Panel B) displays the abnormal returns and the cumulative abnormal returns 
before and after the Berlin attack (i.e., 5, 10 and 20 days after the attack). We first note that the 
German stock market was more responsive to Berlin attack. This result can be explained by the 
popularity of this city. According to travel analysts Euromonitor, Berlin is the most popular 
destination in Germany. It is ranked as the third among the most-visited destinations in Europe. 
Thus, it is hugely expected that the Berlin attack would have an adverse and pronounced impact 
on the amount of visitors, and thereafter on the travel and tourism industries.  The banking and 
financial services and defense sectors were significantly influenced by Berlin attacks but such an 
impact seems weak. Although a decline in the cumulative abnormal returns is found over 5days 
after the event day, a marked increase is shown after 20 days. The negative responses of some 
sectors including airlines, hotels and leisure and telecommunications are observed after the Berlin 
attack. But these negative responses are not persistent. The effect vanishes over time. 
Table 1. The sectoral responses of the German industries to terror attacks 
Panel A. Munich attack 
Sectors AR CAR(-239) CAR5 CAR10 CAR20 
Airlines -1.49* 
(-1.95) 
5.12*** 
(6.21) 
-1.24** 
(-2.80) 
-1.55* 
(-1.95) 
1.62*** 
(3.50) 
Hotels and leisure -0.76* 
(-1.79) 
1.91** 
(2.37) 
-0.76*** 
(-3.42) 
1.17*** 
(3.69) 
1.52*** 
(4.34) 
Telecommunications -1.14** 
(-2.67) 
3.06* 
(1.89) 
-1.69 
(-1.13) 
-0.81** 
(-1.77) 
1.54* 
(1.82) 
Banking and financial services 2.41*** 
(4.38) 
3.17 *** 
(4.29) 
1.71* 
(1.88) 
2.14* 
(1.90) 
3.27*** 
(4.55) 
Defense 1.96** 
(2.80) 
2.16** 
(2.88) 
1.11** 
(2.36) 
1.49* 
(1.72) 
2.14* 
(1.91) 
Panel B. Berlin attack 
Sectors AR CAR(-99) CAR5 CAR10 CAR20 
Airlines -2.38* 
(-1.77) 
1.58*** 
(3.95) 
-2.50** 
(-2.91) 
-3.42*** 
(-5.27) 
1.77** 
(2.68) 
Hotels and leisure -1.69** 
(-2.41) 
1.79*** 
(5.14) 
-0.81*** 
(-4.16) 
-1.34* 
(-1.73) 
1.81* 
(1.99) 
Telecommunications -1.74*** 
(-3.52) 
1.79** 
(2.54) 
-1.87* 
(-1.99) 
-1.69* 
(-1.83) 
1.32* 
(1.75) 
Banking and financial services 1.95** 
(2.81) 
1.68* 
(1.90) 
1.28*** 
(3.49) 
2.40** 
(2.78) 
2.96*** 
(5.32) 
Defense 1.86* 
(1.91) 
1.55* 
(1.87) 
0.81** 
(2.13) 
1.79* 
(1.82) 
2.73** 
(2.84) 
Notes: AR: Abnormal returns; CAR: Cumulative abnormal returns; ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels, respectively. 
Figure 1 accurately depicts the cumulative abnormal returns of sectoral German stock 
market as a reaction to the Munich and Berlin terror attacks with more details for an extended 
event window : [-20, +20]. We confirm that the effect is sector-specific. 
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Figure 1. The cumulative abnormal returns of sectoral German stock market in response to terror 
attacks over an expanded event window  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 display the changes in the short-run systematic risk by industry after Berlin and 
Munich terror attacks (Panels A and B, respectively). Our findings reveal that the terrorist attack 
has yielded to a notable rise in systematic risk for the majority of industries under study, 
particularly for airlines, hotels and leisure and telecommunications. Following the Berlin attack, 
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the airlines sector witnessed a marked rise in systematic risk from 0.16 to 0.89. Likewise, hotels 
and leisure sector experienced also an increase in immediate risk from 0.41 to 0.79. However, we 
clearly note that the periods post-Munich and Berlin attacks are marked by a sharp decline in 
risks for all the industries under consideration. 
 
Table 2. Changes in immediate risk of the German stock market industries after terror attacks 
Sectors Beta prior to the 
attack 
Immediate risk Beta post- attack 
Panel A. Munich attack 
Airlines 0.21 0.92 0.38 
Hotels and leisure 0.15 0.79 0.26 
Telecommunications 0.06 0.48 0.14 
Banking and financial services 0.11 0.17 0.13 
Defense 0.12 0.19 0.14 
Panel B. Berlin attack 
Airlines 0.16 0.89 0.21 
Hotels and leisure 0.21 0.77 0.19 
Telecommunications 0.22 0.31 0.23 
Banking and financial services 0.18 0.27 0.19 
Defense 0.16 0.20 0.15 
 
3.2. Robustness tests 
Throughout the rest of our analysis, we assess the sensitivity of our findings to the 
incorporation of supplementary explanatory variables. The global financial and economic factors 
are largely perceived as potential channels through which sharp changes the global economic and 
financial situations are transmitted to the various industries of the German stock market. Given 
this consideration, we incorporate the German volatility index (VDax) that is calculated by 
Euronext and Eurex, and the world gold price (Gold). We used the gold fixing price 10:30 A.M. 
(London time) downloaded from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. It must be stressed that 
gold has been widely seen as a well-established safe haven investment against stock market 
volatility (Baur and McDermott, 2010). Additionally, the literature in finance has been 
predominantly relied on multiple uncertainty indicators. One of these indicators is the implied 
volatility of stock returns. The latter effectively reflects the increased anxiety of German 
companies surrounding the 2016 terror attacks. In this context, VDax seems sensitive to all 
events that may cause heightened uncertainty including the 2016 terror attacks. Briefly, the 
equation to be estimated is expressed as follows: 
    ittititiftmtiftmtiiftit GoldVDaxDVDVrrrrrr 
~
*~~~~~~ 543210  (4) 
where  0i  denotes the intercept term of the equation [E(
0
i ) = 0], 
1
i  
measures the average 
immediate systematic risk of each industry, 2i refers to the change in the industry risk, and
3
i is 
the intercept of Equation (4), 4i corresponds to the change in the VDax coefficient, 
5
i denotes 
the gold return coefficient, and
it
~
is the error term.  
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By adding VDax and Gold as relevant control variables, our main findings are still fairly 
robust. Table 3 reports the cumulative abnormal returns prior to and post Munich/Berlin attacks. 
We sustain evidence that terror has an adverse impact on most sectors, though with different 
sensitivities. The Munich Berlin attacks are significantly linked to adverse stock prices responses 
of  airlines, hotels and leisure and telecommunications from the event day and the ten first days 
of trading. But these reactions becomes positive after 20 days. Banking and financial services and 
defense sectors appear much less harmed, spotlighting their resilience and efficient adptation to 
terror shocks.  
 
Table 3. The sectoral reactions of the German industries to terror attacks after accounting for 
further control variable 
Panel A. Munich attack 
Sectors AR CAR(-239) CAR5 CAR10 CAR20 
Airlines -1.61** 
(-2.78) 
4.89** 
(2.72) 
-1.42* 
(-1.95) 
-1.61* 
(-1.74) 
1.57*** 
(4.16) 
Hotels and leisure -0.81** 
(-2.45) 
2.17** 
(2.58) 
-0.94** 
(-2.65) 
0.23* 
(1.78) 
1.42** 
(2.33) 
Telecommunications -1.09*** 
(-3.42) 
1.98** 
(2.31) 
-0.67* 
(-1.90) 
0.61** 
(-2.21) 
1.33* 
(1.94) 
Banking and financial services 1.98** 
(2.73) 
4.61 *** 
(3.95) 
1.61** 
(2.49) 
3.23*** 
(4.88) 
3.19*** 
(5.81) 
Defense 1.86*** 
(4.09) 
3.04*** 
(3.26) 
1.40*** 
(3.41) 
2.14* 
(1.83) 
2.68** 
(2.30) 
Panel B. Berlin attack 
Sectors AR CAR(-99) CAR5 CAR10 CAR20 
Airlines -1.76*** 
(-3.11) 
1.81** 
(2.16) 
-1.51* 
(-1.84) 
-1.44** 
(-2.56) 
1.33* 
(1.94) 
Hotels and leisure -1.58* 
(-1.92) 
1.94** 
(2.76) 
-1.23 ** 
(-2.52) 
0.62* 
(1.90) 
1.29*** 
(3.41) 
Telecommunications -0.98** 
(-2.61) 
1.88*** 
(3.39) 
-0.95* 
(-1.74) 
0.76* 
(1.86) 
1.31* 
(2.61) 
Banking and financial services 1.73** 
(2.67) 
1.55* 
(1.78) 
1.61** 
(2.69) 
2.64* 
(1.93) 
3.19** 
(2.73) 
Defense 1.94*** 
(4.24) 
1.53* 
(1.81) 
1.52** 
(1.94) 
2.09* 
(1.85) 
2.53** 
(2.11) 
Notes: AR: Abnormal returns; CAR: Cumulative abnormal returns; ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels, respectively. 
 
Figure 2 describes the cumulative abnormal returns of the German industries in response 
to the two major 2016 terror attacks for an expanded event window. We sustain evidence of 
heterogenuous responses of the sectoral Geman stock market, and that the various industries 
studied are more responsive to Berlin attack. 
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Figure 2. The cumulative abnormal returns of sectoral German stock market in response to terror 
attacks over an expanded event window after accounting for further control variables 
 
 
 
Besides, the changes in the short-term systematic risk following the 2016 Munich and 
Berlin attacks by sector remain robust after adding further control variables (in particular, VDax 
and Gold). Table 4 summarizes the results for Munich and Berlin attacks (Panels A and B, 
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respectively). We consistently document that (a) terror attacks had prompted a marked increase in 
systematic risk for all sectors, though with varying extent, and (b) the immediate risk drops 
sharply after Berlin and Munich event days; this holds valid for all the industries under study. 
 
Table 4. Changes in immediate risk of the German industries after controlling for further 
control variables 
Sectors Beta prior to the attack Immediate risk Beta post-attack 
Panel A. Munich attack 
Airlines 0.14 0.68 0.19 
Hotels and leisure 0.10 0.54 0.13 
Telecommunications 0.12 0.39 0.16 
Banking and financial services 0.08 0.19 0.10 
Defense 0.11 0.17 0.09 
Panel B. Berlin attack 
Airlines 0.19 0.79 0.24 
Hotels and leisure 0.17 0.66 0.19 
Telecommunications 0.13 0.44 0.16 
Banking and financial services 0.11 0.20 0.13 
Defense 0.14 0.18 0.12 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
The noticeable surge in the number of terrorist attacks in Europe in recent years likely 
implies that the price of terrorism will continue to rise. Much significant research has shown that 
terrorist attacks are significantly associated with episodes of heightened uncertainty, and thus, it is 
of interest to explore the effects of terrorism on stock market performances to appropriately 
guide policy. Throughout this paper, we assess, by means of relatively new econometric tools (i.e., 
an improved event study methodology) the stock price responses of German industries to Berlin 
and Munich terrorist attacks happening in 2016 to provide fresh insights regarding the losses 
caused by these dramatic events.  
This article’ outcomes deeply suggest that Munich and Berlin attacks significantly 
influence the German stock market. But this effect seems sector-specific. More accurately, some 
sectors had proven their great resilience and adaptability to these unforeseen terror including 
banking and financial services and defense industries. The financial sector provides adequate 
liquidity to foster market stability and curb panic. The prompt adaptation of defense sector might 
be attributed to the fact that an increase in terror attacks enforced German government to 
seriously and swiftly act by funding programs designed to keep cities more secure from terrorist 
attacks, and to further enhance military technologies and capabilities to successfully fight 
terrorism. Airlines, hotels and leisure and communication services, however, have been harmfully 
affected by terror. But these responses did not persist. Expectedly, the immediate effect of any 
potential event might prompt negative abnormal returns due to rising uncertainty as the new 
information is being well absorbed and the possible consequences of terror are carefully assessed, 
equities might return to their pre-event states. 
Regardless of the subsequent terror attacks, German industries appear sharply resilient 
towards terror. This underscores that the German market conditions have the ability to bounce 
12 
 
back instantly or swiftly, as economic resilience and investors’ trust roll back short-term setbacks. 
This may reflect an industrial strength that has been widely evaluated in global competition over 
several decades and has demonstrated its great resilience and prompt and efficient adaptation to 
unforeseen shocks. The increased financial integration has allowed Germany to safeguard against 
major events or sudden shocks. For a country mainly distinguished by its financial 
system’s soundness and stability (IMF, 2017) as well as its higher ability to innovate and to 
compete globally, terror attacks are less likely to have pronounced and long-term financial and 
economic repercussions. Last but not least, hedging and financing tools, which are usually 
substantially linked to investment banking, form an integral part of financial services for German 
companies, which may also help to successfully deal with sudden shocks.  
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Appendix 
Figure A.1. Terrorism risk in Europe 
 
Source : Foreign & Commonwealth Office. 
 
 
